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27 SEP 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR : Chief, Administration & Training Staff

SUBJECT : Internal Management Review  
of the Office of Security

1. The two basic functions of IOS are investigations, of both an overt and covert nature, and operational support. At present the investigative caseload seemingly has leveled off to a number we can expect to remain fairly constant for the next several years. To reduce the number of investigative personnel would seriously hinder the investigative completion time and the caliber of the investigative product. Operational support encompasses a myriad of categories, making it impossible to list them in any order of priority, due to the requirements of the requestor. Any additional cuts in personnel would seriously curtail our ability to support the DDI, DDP, DDS, DDS&T as well as the DCI himself. Cuts in personnel would eliminate IOS surveillances and defector handling capabilities and seriously curtail the existing program of operational support.

2. If a mandatory reduction of personnel were enforced, IOS would give up the following positions in the order presented:

	<u>Functions</u>	<u>Positions</u>
	CI/CE	GS-12
		GS-09
25X1A		GS-14
		GS-13
	K Checks	GS-13
		GS-09
		GS-07

Functions

Positions

25X1A

Project 

Positions previously  
lost without losing  
the function.

25X1C




GS-12  
GS-05 (4 slots)

Position previously  
lost without losing  
the function.

Alien Affairs Staff

GS-15  
GS-14  
GS-08

Other than the savings of salaries, the above reductions would result in no appreciable monetary savings, unless we were to relinquish paying for 

25X1C

3. For the current organizational structure, please refer to the IOS Position Control Register.



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Deputy Director of Security (IOS)

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Chief, Administration and Training Staff

25 August 1972

Chief, Security Research Staff

## Internal Management Review of the Office of Security

1. Attached, per your request, are the materials I have assembled in accordance with your internal management review requirements.

2. You will note in Attachment I that I have designated a clerical position for abolishment by 30 June 1973. This is a file, visitor and telephone control position which has been extremely valuable to the functioning of this Staff, and elimination of the position anticipates shifting many of the duties to already overburdened secretarial and professional personnel and increased delays in service to our customers in external liaison and internal inquiries, as well as day-to-day Staff operations.

3. I have not designated a specific position for elimination, if required, for the succeeding Fiscal Year. The specific position to be affected by such action will have to be determined when said reduction becomes imperative and will be based upon the priorities and needs of the Staff at that time. You will note that Attachment I projects a staffing of [REDACTED] employees following such action.


25X9

4. Attachment II addresses itself to management improvement and consideration of possible future transfer or elimination of certain charter functions of this Staff if further slashes in personnel and budget are directed. Attachment III deals with personnel reduction; Attachment IV deals with monetary savings. In Attachment V, I have outlined specific priority efforts by this

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EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF E.O. 11652, EXEMPTION CATEGORY:
§ 52(1), (2), (3) or (4) (circle one or more)
AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON
<i>Approval of DCI</i>
(unless impossible, insert date or event)

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Staff, to the exclusion of day-to-day administration and charter operations maintenance, with a highly accurate measurement of personnel assigned to each of the priority tasks, based on management reporting which I regularly require of my subordinates.

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Attachments:  
As stated

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## ATTACHMENT II

### OTHER MANAGEMENT IMPROVEMENTS

#### Documentation, Correspondence and Form Processing

Because of the nature of this Staff, reporting and documentation of work performed in counterintelligence research must be by detailed, often lengthy, memorandum. Except for highly compartmented activity, original copies of such research reports are placed in appropriate security files; where compartmentation is required either by regulation or topic matter, appropriate security files are flagged with reference to compartmented files retained in this Staff or by other cooperating non-Office of Security Agency elements.

Correspondence with other Agency elements and liaison is by memorandum. However, for correspondence with other elements of the Office of Security, we lean heavily on the "speed letter." We encourage requestors to utilize the form whenever possible to allow single-sheet documentation of both the request, work performed and response. Certain other forms, originated by other OS elements with a high frequency of referral to this Staff, are also utilized to a high degree to reduce memoranda.

This Staff presently has only one internally generated and forms management approved form, that being a control card for security files moving into, about and from the Staff. It has proven much more effective than chronological control books previously used by this Staff and still in use by many OS elements.

I have examined our present procedures, and see only one possible area for reduction of Staff effort in correspondence, that being implementation of a requirement that OS requestors of special source checks extract the necessary information from files, i.e. names and biographic data, prior to submission to us. (At present, this action is performed by this Staff upon receipt of the pertinent security files.) Because the requestors are generally unfamiliar with the significant data necessary for the unique source checks, and the frequent changes in data requirements by source managers, I have concluded that to have the requestors do the extracting would probably be more time-consuming and generate more problems than it would resolve.

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### Coordination

Coordination with other Agency and Office of Security elements is generally conducted on a verbal basis and documented by notation or memorandum for the record (depending on the importance of the situation or complexity of the coordination), or by use of the several coordination forms generated for specific purposes by other OS elements. External coordination, including liaison, is always documented by memorandum. Although I agree with the concept that coordinations are best kept to a minimum, the very nature of Staff operations requires a high degree of coordination. These are routine procedures and are not a major management factor for this Staff.

### SOP's

Because of the widely-varied requirements upon this Staff, the tasks performed and the wide-ranging source and liaison contacts, both internally and externally, firm SOP's are not the practice. Rather, I exercise administrative and case management on a situation basis through the Deputy Chief and the respective Branch Chiefs.

SRS does have certain procedures, perhaps best described as "unwritten laws" which are akin to SOP, though not formally designated as such.

One such procedure relates to response to inquiries addressed to this Staff. Unless appropriately justified to me, such requests for information are given high priority response and in no case should exceed three working days. The use of this procedure enables me, as a manager, to monitor all on-going matters which might require inordinate research or Staff work, and to give direction, both as to priorities and to work method. (This, of course, is not applicable to those matters in which we are merely the channel to certain external source programs and governmental liaison officers, in which case response time must necessarily hinge upon the performance of those sources and liaison officers.)

I require that source reports be generated on all items of security interest or where security action appears necessary. Depending on the degree of urgency of the requisite action anticipated, response ranges from immediate and verbal to three days and written.

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I do not establish deadlines for analysis of special intelligence input because of the limited man-hours which can be devoted to it and the large, continuing backlog, but insist that all material be screened upon receipt to assure that immediate action items are identified and acted upon without further delay.

Of course, strict compartmentation is enforced in regard to special source, source, program, liaison and other programs where such is required.

One practice, although not a firm SOP, is also worthy of note in sharing management experience. In the past several years we have faced extreme operational hardship with the successive reductions in clerical personnel. Because of the detailed reporting required by research, so-called "short-form" documentation of work is not effective or desirable. To facilitate production and to relieve clerical personnel of time-consuming transcription and report drafting, I have long encouraged Staff members with typing skills to type and correct all research drafts prior to referral to clerical personnel for final typing. As a result, ten of our fourteen professionals exercise this option and make due use of "cut and paste" before final reports are prepared, frequently tempting me to aggressively encourage acquisition of typing skills by the remaining officers. The Office of Security might well give serious consideration to that temptation, and encourage greater use of preliminary typing by those OS professionals having typing skills and acquisition of those skills by professionals lacking in them.

(In line with experience sharing, it might be well here to offer another suggestion to deal with the adverse effects of past and contemplated reductions in secretarial personnel. Presently, with authorized secretarial personnel working at near-maximum effective output, we are sorely pressed when one of them is on sick or annual leave. I am certain this is also a problem confronting other OS components. It might be well to consider a limited-size pool of clerical-typing generalists, well-schooled in overall OS procedures and organization, who could be assigned to this and other OS units on a temporary basis during extended absence on sick or annual leave by regularly assigned personnel.)

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Other Management Work Load Factors

At the present time, it can be stated quite frankly that work load of assigned tasks exceeds personnel available to perform the tasks. To effect further reduction in professional manpower within this Staff, policy decisions must be made as to which tasks should be totally discontinued or transferred to other OS components.

An examination of our priority functions in this light is appropriate:



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### ATTACHMENT III

#### PERSONNEL REDUCTIONS

As indicated earlier, we have programmed for the reduction of one clerical position for the Fiscal Year ending 30 June 1973, and have braced ourselves for the possible reduction of an additional professional position in the indefinite future. These are not conducive to effective operations of this Staff, and are accepted only as managerial necessities.

Examination of our priority programs reflects that any significant personnel reductions can be obtained through elimination of entire programs or reductions within the Staff, but not the Office of Security, by transfer of certain efforts to other OS elements.

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#### ATTACHMENT IV

#### MONETARY SAVINGS

As with the previous attachment, only total elimination of certain programs would result in significant monetary savings. Such is at present most impractical and would render the Agency highly vulnerable. Certain potential for function transfer previously mentioned would result, in some programs, with a reduction in Staff expenditures but not Office of Security expenditures.

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<b>TRANSMITTAL SLIP</b>		DATE 28 August 1972
TO: Chief, Executive Staff		
ROOM NO. 4E-60	BUILDING Hqs.	
REMARKS: <p><i>Step -</i>  <i>Attached is forwarded for</i>  <i>your comments along w/ other</i>  <i>studies which hopefully will</i>  <i>be available prior to next</i>  <i>Scheduled meeting on 19 Sept</i>  <i>1030 Am in the Conference room.</i></p>		
FROM: Chief, SRS		
ROOM NO. 4E-13	BUILDING Hqs.	EXTENSION 7682

FORM NO. 241  
1 FEB 55

REPLACES FORM 36-8  
WHICH MAY BE USED.

(47)

25X1A